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ABSTRACT. 
This paper is focused on the allocation of vacant jobs to job seekers 
from a demand side perspective by studying the recruitment behaviour of 
employers. A model is developed to analyze the role of search and 
selection methods of employers as determinants of the re-employment 
probabilities of the unemployed. 
In an empirical application for the Dutch labour market, we have 
examined the effect of the recruitment behaviour of employers on the 
chances for unemployed individuals to get a job. This is carried out by 
testing whether the probability of acquiring a vacant job by an 
unemployed individual is influenced by the use of different 
recruitment channels by the employer and the requirements for the 
applicants imposed by the employer. 
We find that job requirements for the applicants are the most important 
determinant of the re-employment probability of the unemployed. In 
addition, the use of search methods by the employer does also have a 
significant effect. 
s? 
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• 
1. A BIRD'S EYE OVERVIEW 
In the last decade numerous studies on unemployment have been 
carried out as a consequence of structural mismatches on labour markets 
in most western countries. Recent research is in particular 
concentrating on the issue of long-term unemployment. The almost 
universal rise in the relative share of long-term unemployment has 
stimulated a large number of studies into the nature of long-term 
unemployment. In fig 1.1 the trend of long-term unemployment is shown 
for the Netherlands. 
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Figure 1.1 Long-Term Unemployment for Males in the Netherlands (long-
term refers to those unemployed for more than 12 months)1. 
Many theories have been developed in order to explain the observed 
high level of unemployment in industrialized countries (see for example 
Malinvaud, 1977, Solow, 1980 and Mortensen, 1986). The consequences of 
structural economie change and the effects of the social security 
system are often used as explanatory elements in these theories. More 
recently, the theory of hvsteresis has become popular among economists. 
Hysteresis of unemployment is defined as the dependence of the "natural 
rate" of unemployment on past unemployment realizations and has been 
examined at the macro level in several empirical studies (see for an 
overview, Johnson and Layard, 1987). For example, Blanchard and 
Summers (1986) have hypothesized that sticky wages due to insider-
outsider bargaining cause the hysteresis of unemployment. 
At the micro level hysteresis of unemployment implies the 
presence of duration dependence of unemployment, i.e. a positive effect 
of the current spell of unemployment on future unemployment. There is 
still a (mainly empirical) debate going on about the magnitude and 
causes of the duration dependence effect (see among others, Heekman 
and Borjas, 1980, Lynch 1984, Narendranathan and Nickell, 1985)2. 
Duration dependence may occur because employers believe - justified or 
not - that the unemployed lose their ability to work during their 
unemployed period, because skills of the unemployed are gradually 
declining (the "deskilling" effect). In that case, the employers will 
not hire the long-term unemployed anymore. When this view is based on 
1
 Source; Central Bureau of Statistics. 
2
 See for an overview of the empirical findings of duration 
dependence in the Netherlands, Gorter et al (1989). 
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prior ideas about unemployed people and not based on their actual 
skills, duration dependence is not caused by a lack of ability as such 
of the unemployed, but by (unjustified) stigtnatization by the employer 
(the "stigma" effect, see also Budd et al., 1987 and Ebmer, 1989). 
The fundamental question to be raised at the micro level is why 
unemployed people remain unemployed so long or - to put it differently 
- why unemployed people do not easilv get a 1ob. Labour market research 
on the re-employment probabilities of the unemployed has mainly 
concentrated on supply-side factors (which might be due to data 
limitations at the demand side) in order to explain differences in 
unemployment duration of individuals. 
A widely used method of analysis for studying the duration of 
unemployment is the hazard-rate approach in which the differences in 
the leaving (hazard) rate of the unemployed are assessed and explained 
(see for example, Lancaster, 1979, Nickell, 1979, Van Opstal and 
Theeuwes, 1985, Ter Huurne, 1988, Gorter et al.,1989). The relevant 
labour market characteristics in the hazard-rate approach are usually: 
- educational level 
- occupational group 
- gender 
- age 
- region 
- labour market history 
- search behaviour (duration, methods and intensity) 
Within the field of duration models, one can distinguish between a 
structural and a "reduced form" approach. In the structural hazard rate 
approach of job search, the (optimal) search behaviour of the 
unemployed is explicitly included in the model in contrast to the 
"reduced form" model where the observed differences in leaving rates 
are related to differences in personal labour market characteristics 
aud general labour market conditions (such as the vacancy rate) in a 
non-behavioural context. 
In the structural hazard-rate approach of job search, the emphasis 
is placed on the labour market characteristics and the search behaviour 
of the (unemployed) individual (see for a survey, Lippman and McCall, 
1976). In this approach, one assumes that an unemployed job seeker 
selects from a pool of job offers. By setting a reservation wage 
(dependent on personal circumstances and non-working income), the 
unemployed individual specifies his minimum demands with respect to the 
wage level. The optimal search strategy is then to wait for a wage 
offer higher than the reservation wage. A crucial assumption is that 
when a job offer is made to an individual, acceptance by the job-seeker 
leads to a match of the job and the seeker. Labour market conditions 
are here summarized in just one variable, namely the job-offer arrival 
rate. This implies that the way vacant jobs are allocated to searchers 
is taken as an exogenous variable in this analysis. 
In reality however, the matching process of labour demand (vacant 
job) and labour supply (job-seeker) is influenced by both the behaviour 
of the job seeker and of the employee-searcher, and is thus much more 
complex. 
Vacant jobs are not offered unconditionally to any person. 
Employers with a vacant job usually start a recruitment procedure in 
which suitable applicants are selected and finally they offer the job 
to the optimal (or at least acceptable) candidate. In Goodwin and 
Carlson (1981) the actual recruitment process of a new employee is 
subdivided into three stages: 
1) search process for candidates by the employer 
2) selection process in which the optimal candidate is chosen by the 
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employer 
3) the decision of accepting the job offer by the employee 
Job search theory is normally only concerned with the last step 
(by means of the structural model of the hazard-rate approach), whilst 
the impact of employer search is manifest in the first two steps. In 
other words, in the structural hazard-rate approach of the re-
employment probabilities the starting point is the unemployed 
individual searching and selecting a job, whereas in a demand-side 
approach the starting point is the vacant job with the employer 
searching and selecting the optimal candidate. The latter approach has 
not received much attention in the scientific literature until now. 
Only a limited number of empirical demand-side oriented studies have 
been carried out (see for example, Beaumont, 1978, Roper, 1988, Van 
Ours, 1989, and Renes, 1989). 
In figure 1.2, both approaches are shown in one framework. 
VACANT JOB 
* type of firm 
* type of job 
* required skills 
* recruitment 
behaviour 
JOB SEEKER 
* labour market 
characteristics 
* search behaviour 
* labour market 
history 
MATCH 
Demand-side 
oriented 
Supply-side 
oriented 
Figure 1.2 Matching of Supply and Demand. 
The matching of vacant jobs and job seekers is a simultaneous 
process of job searchers trying to find a job and employers trying to 
fuifil their vacancies. So preferably, the analysis of unemployment 
histories should use both sides of the market, i.e. an integration of 
the hazard-rate (job search) approach with the demand-side oriented 
(employer search) approach. In Osberg et al. (1986) an attempt is made 
to incorporate demand side variables (though not reflecting the 
behaviour of the employers) in the analysis of re-employment 
probabilities of unemployed using a "reduced form" model. The 
conclusion was that estimates of individual unemployment incidence and 
duration which omit consideration of the firms to lay off and hire 
particular workers will suffer from omitted variables bias. 
In structural job search studies demand side influences are only 
very restrictedly included (such as the job-offer arrival rate) which 
is, as said before, probably due to lack of data. 
Job search studies on the effect of labour market characteristics 
and the search effect of the unemployed on the re-employment 
probability are informative about the relative chances of getting and 
accepting a job, but do not offer much insight into the allocation 
mechanisms of vacant jobs, which is mainly controlled by the 
employers' search and selection behaviour. In this view, job 
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availability 'rather than wages act as an adjustment mechanism in 
equating labour supply and demand. It is not the high reservation wage 
of the job searcher, but rather the level of job availability which 
determines the chances of getting a job. 
In order to fill this gap, the present study concentrates on the 
effect of recruitment behaviour of the employers on the allocation of 
vacant jobs. In other words, the focus is on the causal relationship 
between the search and selection behaviour of the employer (given the 
type of job) and the chances for unemployed individuals of getting a 
job. 
The importance of the analysis of the recruitment behaviour of 
the employer in this analysis lies in the fact that 
a) employers requirements for the applicants may be impossible to 
fuifil by unemployed individuals (for example, if work experience 
is required)3. 
b) the use of search channels by the employer which may not (or to a 
lower extent) reach the unemployed ( for example, if internal 
recruitment is used). 
Clearly, this demand-side oriented approach differs strongly from the 
job search approach in which labour market characteristics and the 
search behaviour of the unemployed individual are the explanatory 
variables. 
In this paper, we will use a demand side approach by means of a 
discrete regression model in which the dependent variable is the 
outcome of the allocation process of the vacant job with respect to the 
previous labour market position of the accepted applicant. In the 
analytical framework of this allocation process it will then be 
possible to test the following hypotheses: 
I) the probability of fulfilment of a vacant job by an unemployed 
individual is influenced by the recruitment channels used by the 
employer in the search for applicants. 
II) the probability of fulfilment of a vacant job by an unemployed 
individual is influenced by the required characteristics of the 
applicant imposed by the employer. 
For testing these hypotheses, we have to examine the significance of 
the effect of using different recruitment channels and of specifying 
different required characteristics on the outcome of the allocation 
process with respect to the previous labour market position of the 
accepted applicant, while controlling for other relevant variables such 
as the characteristics of the job and the type of firm. 
2. A DISCRETE REGRESSION MODEL 
In this section, we will present the derivation of our allocation 
model. The allocation of vacant jobs starts with the employer who is 
searching for applicants by means of certain recruitment channels. If 
it is assumed that employers are rational decision makers in choosing a 
candidate when they have a vacancy, then they will compare the 
applicants on the basis of a set of relevant individual qualifications 
or characteristics. Next, the employer will select the most suitable 
applicant for the vacant job. 
3
 If unemployed people have the required skills, it is still 
uncertain whether they will get the job or not, because this is 
dependent on the preferences of the employer. 
h 
In this 'case, the following expression of the probability for an 
individual to get a job can be formulated: 
Pr (individual i will get job type j | recruitment channel k ) = 
q i j * P t j k * F ( x i , z J ) 
s i q i j * P i J k * F ( x 1 , z j ) 
( i ) 
with q±, - probability that individual i is willing to fuifil 
job j* 
Pi ik = Probability that individual i becomes part of the 
actual choice set for vacancy j if recruitment 
channel k is used 
Xt = the qualifications of individual i 
Z, = the characteristics of the vacant job j 
f(Xi,Zj) = the suitability of individual i for vacancy j 
Ideally, we would estimate relationship (1) on the basis of data 
on the characteristics of the vacancy and the qualifications of the 
applicants. However, this kind of data is usually not available. A 
notable exception is the study of Mattson and Weibull (1981) in which a 
multinominal logit model of allotment of job openings among applicants 
is estimated. In this study, the emphasis lies on the impact of 
characteristics of the applicant, but there is also limited Information 
about vacancy characteristics (viz. the occupational group). 
The data on vacancies available to us offers much information on 
vacancy characteristics, but almost nothing is known on the labour 
market characteristics of the applicants. We have only knowledge of 
the previous labour market position and the educational level of the 
accepted applicant (see Appendix A for further details of the data); 
nothing is known about applicants who where not accepted. Consequently, 
we have to adjust relationship (1) by formulating a set of assumptions 
in order to allow an empirical estimation of the model. 
In our approach we will distinguish three types of applicants on 
the basis of their labour market position, viz. the employed (E), the 
unemployed (U) and the persons leaving school (S). 
The following sets are defined: 
Tw - set of all potential applicants of type W (W - E, U or S) 
Swik " s e t °f all actual applicants of type W, given job j with 
recruitment channel k 
The number of elements of Tw and S w j k are M„ and N w j k respectively. 
Then we have 
E(NHjk> " 2, q^Pijk . i € Tw (2) 
and we assume that the set of Tw is so large that the difference 
between the actual Nw,k and its expected value is negligible. 
A
 It is implicitly assumed that people who are willing to work 
will accept a job offer with probability 1. 
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Unfortundtely, our data set does not inform us about the size of 
the Nw. k' s. In order to arrive at a meaningfui relationship to be 
estimated the following assumptions are made. First, it is assumed that 
two kinds of applicants can be distinguished: those who are willing to 
work (qt1 = 1) and those who are not willing (qti - 0). Further, we 
assume that pi1k is equal for all willing individuals in a certain 
group W: 
Thus one arrivés at: 
tlij*Pijk = Pwjk f o r a 1 1 "willing" persons i e l , 
(3) 
q1J*pijk = 0 for all "non-willing" persons i € Tw 
Let a.v, denote the fraction of applicants of type W who are willing to 
fuifil job j. Further, let fw. denote the average suitability for this 
job of an applicant of type W (willing to fuifil job j): 
1 
fwj * Si FCX^Zj) (4) 
where summation takes place over all "willing" persons i € Tw. 
Then it follows from (1) to (4) that 
Pr (individual of type W will get job type j | channel k ) = 
k*0[wj1*w* fwj 
2w P v j k * a w j M W * f W j 
(5) 
Now, it is assumed that the probability that an individual of type W 
(willing to fuifil job j) will become part of the actual choice set for 
vacancy j depends on the search methods of the employer for job vacancy 
j in the following way: 
Pwjk " 8wk(Zj) (6) 
Further, we suppose that 
fwj = fv(Zj) (7) 
and that 
°wj*M„ " ^ ( Z j ) * ^ (8) 
The latter assumption means that the number of individuals of type W, 
who are willing to fuifil job j, will depend on the type of job and the 
absolute number of individuals of type W. 
Then (5) can be written as 
Pr (individual of type W will get job type j | channel k ) -
8„k(ZJ)*aw(ZJ)*Uv*fv(Zi) 
(9) 
=w &«k<Zj)*aw(Zj)*Mtt*ftt(Zj) 
Although the probability of interest (5) is now written in terms of the 
known variables Z, and 1^, it is still impossible to identify the 
separate effects of the access to information of job vacancy j (gwk)» 
the competition between applicants (aw) and the suitability of the 
applicants (fw) on the probability that an individual of type W will 
get a vacant job j. 
Therefore the numerator of (9) is simplified as follows: 
gwk(Zj)*aw(Zj)*Mw*fw(Zj) = MH*h(/3w*Zj , Mw*dk,) (10) 
where )3w,pw are the parameters to be estimated and dk is a dummy 
variable representing the use of different search channels by the 
employer. 
If we specify 
Mw*h(/3w*Zj, pv*dk) = exp ( /3w*Zj + pw*dk + ln(M„) ) (11) 
then we arrive at a multinomial logit model (see Maddala, 1983), which 
can be estimated by means of Standard procedures5• 
Thus, in this model specification the outcome of the recruitment 
(search and selection) behaviour of the employer with respect to the 
type of worker is related to the characteristics of the job vacancy, 
the choice of the recruitment channels and the number of potential 
applicants. In other words, the result of the allocation process can be 
associated with the type of vacancy and the search methods of the 
employer. This will make it possible to see which type of jobs are 
allocated to employed people, unemployed people or people leaving 
school respectively and how the use of different search channels 
influences this allocation. 
It is noteworthy here that essentially we do not have a structural 
model in which the effects of competition between applicants and search 
and selection behaviour of the employer can be identified (for each 
type of job vacancy) as well as the willingness of applicants to accept 
a job, but in f act a "reduced form" model in which we will investigate 
the distribution of vacant jobs over the different types of workers6. 
5
 It can be shown that the coefficients /3W and /iw are not 
uniquely determined, so that a reference group r has to be chosen with 
an arbitrary constant (for example /3r«/ir-0) in order to identify the 
parameters of the model. Furthermore, we note that the term ln(M„) will 
be absorbed in the parameter of the constant term Pv0* , which is equal 
to /3w0 + ln(M„). 
6
 One may also formulate other sets of assumptions which lead to 
specification (11). 
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3- THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES. 
In this paper we will apply the discrete regression model 
specified in section 2 to data on job vacancies in the Netherlands7. 
This data set consists of a sample of 763 vacancies. On the basis 
of this representative sample, it is possible to get a reasonable idea 
of the total number of vacancies in the Netherlands. It appears that-
on a yearly basis - about 540,000 vacancies are fulfilled of which 
about 32% are related to new jobs. In this paper, we address the 
question whether (and to which extent) the unemployed get an 
opportunity to fulfill these vacancies or whether these jobs will 
mainly become occupied by other groups at the labour market. 
In the sample, employers were asked about the characteristics of 
the firm and the vacant job, their recruitment methods and some 
characteristics of the accepted applicant. The latter category gives 
information about the previous labour market position of the accepted 
applicant (employed, unemployed or leaving school) until the moment of 
acceptance, which will be the dependent variable of our model (from 
now on, we will refer to this dependent variable in abbreviated form as 
PLMP). The outcome of the allocation process with respect to this 
variable can be related to a number of explanatory variables (see also 
(11) in section 2). These variables will be discussed in this section. 
It should be recalled that the aim of this study is to test the 
two hypotheses formulated in section 1. First, we want to examine 
whether the way information is spread by the employer does influence 
the outcome of the allocation process on the labour market. The concept 
of information as a strategie variable in matching processes on the 
labour market was for instance discussed in Clark (1987). Secondly, the 
impact of required characteristics imposed by the employers on the 
outcome of the allocation process will be analyzed in greater detail. 
First, the variables directly corresponding to the above mentioned 
hypotheses will be discussed. Next, we will pay attention to the 
remaining variables included in the model. 
1. The recruitment channels. 
It is plausible that the choice of the recruitment channels by the 
employer has decisive consequences for the allocation of jobs to 
the unemployed individuals (the importance of accessibility to 
such channels is - among others - stressed by Saunders and 
Flowerdew, 1987 and Fischer and Nijkamp, 1989). In the most 
obvious case, the job is directly allocated to a candidate from 
inside the firm and as a result unemployed individuals (and other 
people outside the firm) stay aside. This channel will be referred 
to as the internal recruitment channel8. 
Employers recruitment through informal contacts is often popular 
7
 The data source is described in full detail in Appendix A. 
8
 Due to the selection mechanism in the sampling of the data, 
there are no vacancies for which the employer searches exclusively by 
means of internal recruitment channels. Therefore, the use of internal 
channels is underrepresentated in our model. It is known from the 
entire survey that in about 8Z of the vacancies the search process was 
exclusively undertaken by means of internal recruitment channels. 
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due to 'the reduction in cost and the provision of reliable 
information about job applicants. In addition, applicants 
recruited through informal contacts do usually live in the 
neighbourhood of the firm and hence there is probably no need for 
a move for the applicant, which makes the probability of 
acceptance of the job offer by the chosen applicant higher. 
Besides the internal recruitment channel the employer may use his 
network of relations to hire people in an informal, direct way. 
This channel is called the external relations channel. The chances 
for unemployed people are relatively low if the employer decides 
to recruit via such external contacts. Only when the unemployed 
individuals have a social network (a sufficiënt number of working 
people), then their chances may be higher. 
The use of informal information channels is often not sufficiënt 
to fuif il the vacancies of the employers. In that case, the 
employer does (also) use formal recruitment methods. In general 
there are three formal ways of seeking contact with job 
applicants, namely the use of advertisements, the use of the 
labour exchange office and the use of a private employment office. 
Advertising probably leads to the largest f low of applicants, 
maximizing the selection possibilities for the employers. So, 
although it is easy for unemployed individuals to have knowledge 
about the existence of the vacant job, competition will be often 
severe. 
Chances for the unemployed to get a job may be higher if employers 
register their vacancy at the labour exchange office, because the 
exchange office tries to match the job with the registered 
searchers, who are mainly unemployed people. The outcome is of 
course uncertain because the decision to accept the unemployed job 
searcher is still taken by the employer. 
Finally, the employer may search with the help of a private 
employment office. These offices may propose employees on a 
flexible basis which is attractive for the firm if temporary 
workers on an irregular basis are needed. For the unemployed, this 
channel might be successful, because temporary, irregular jobs are 
not always attractive to fuil time employed workers. On the other 
hand, however, there may also be a strong competition of first-
time entrants on the labour market who are also looking for 
temporary jobs. In our analysis this channel will also include all 
other channels which are sometimes used by the employer (such as 
direct mailing of people leaving school) and will be referred to 
as other channels. 
2. Required characteristics 
The second class of variables, corresponding to the second 
hypothesis, consists of three classes of indicators: 
i) age 
ii) education 
- minimal required level 
- specific educational qualification 
iii) work experience 
The outcome of the allocation process (i.e. the choice of the 
employer) concerning the PLMP is expected to be influenced by the 
kind of requirements to be fulfilled by the job applicant. 
Clearly, work experience requirements can often hardly be 
fulfilled by unemployed people and hence this variable is expected 
to have a negative effect on the choice of an unemployed person 
for the vacant job (instead of an employed person). The same may 
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be true ' f or the variable reflecting eduational requirements, 
because on average unemployed people have a lower educational 
level relative to the employed people. Finally, it depends on the 
age structure of the unemployed whether the age requirements can 
be met. If the employers do not want to hire older people, a large 
part of the unemployed do not have high chances to get a job 
anymore. 
Secondly, the remaining variables in the analysis of the choice of 
the PLMP by the employers will be discussed9. The reason for including 
control variables is that the recruitment behaviour (and the outcome of 
the allocation process choice) will differ among jobs and firms and 
hence excluding would lead to omitted variable bias. 
Job characteristics can be classified into two groups, viz. the 
kind of occupational group the job belongs to and the kind of contract 
offered to the applicant (permanent versus temporary and fuil-time 
versus part-time). Firm characteristics are summarized in terms of firm 
size location of the firm and sectoral characteristics of the firm. 
The use of the latter variable, together with the occupational 
group variable, however does create a problem. Regarding the cross-
classification of occupational group and sector of the firm we may 
of ten find a high degree of correspondence between the two variables. 
In order to prevent multicollinearity in our model a choice between the 
both classifications has to be made. We have dealt with this choice 
problem here by performing the analysis on both classifications 
successively. A specification test will then show which classification 
gives the best fit of the data, whilst it will also provide a check on 
the robustness of the parameters of the other variables. 
In the variant at the sectoral level (variant A), we distinguish 
four types of sectors: 
* construction sector 
* industrial sector 
* services sector 
* quaternary sector 
whilst in the variant at the occupational level (variant B), the 
following six occupational classes are distinguished: 
* administrative functions 
* technical functions 
* sales functions 
* medical/educational/social functions 
* functions in production 
* other functions (including domestic/management functions) 
The other firm characteristics to be incorporated in the model are 
the size and the location of the firm. For the definition of the 
latter variable, the Netherlands is subdivided into urban and rural 
areas (see map 3.1)10. 
In summary, variables reflecting job and firm characteristics are 
included in the analysis of the choice of the job applicant made by 
the employer, because the outcome of the PLMP may be different among 
jobs and firms. These differences may occur as a result of differences 
in11: 
9
 We will refer to these variables as control variables because 
they are not directly related to the hypotheses of section 1. 
10
 Source: "Fourth Memorandum of Physical Planning", Ministry of 
Housing and Planning, (1988). 
See also section 2. 10 
i) the degree of competition among applicants. Both the absolute 
number of applicants and the relative number of each category 
(employed, unemployed or leaving school) are important here (see 
for a discussion of the effect of competition among applicants for 
job openings also Rogerson, 1987). 
ii) the average suitabilitv of the different categories to fuifil a 
particular job in a certain firm. 
iii) the willingness to work of the different categories. 
iv) discriminatorv selection behaviour of the employer. 
v) unobserved characteristics of the vacant job (such as, for 
example, the working conditions). 
Unfortunately, it is - as mentioned bef ore - impossible with our 
data set to measure the effects of competition, suitability, 
willingness to work and discrimination on the PLMP separately, because 
we do not have Information on these items. Therefore variables related 
to the type of job or firm will only represent the aggregate of those 
effects for a certain job or firm, respectively. 
Legend: 
m = urban areas 
• = rural areas 
Map 3.1 Urban and Rural Areas of the Netherlands 
Some summary indicators of the available data are given in 
Appendix A. 
In the next section, the estimation results of the logit analysis 
will be presented for model variant A (sectoral classification) and 
model variant B (occupational classification). The postulated 
hypotheses will then be tested and the relative order of magnitude of 
11 
the impact of each variable on the probability that an unemployed 
individual is chosen (in stead of an employed individual or a person 
leaving school) to fuifil a vacant job will be estimated. 
4. RESULTS OF THE LOGIT MODEL. 
4.1 Introduction. 
In this section, we will first provide the estimation results of 
the logit model specified in (11) and next evaluate the importance of 
the various explanatory variables. 
The aim of this analysis is to estiraate the discrete regression 
model which is able to explain the outcome of the allocation process 
with respect to the previous labour market position of the accepted 
applicant (PLMP) as a result of the choice made by the employer who has 
a vacant job to fuif il. This is done by estimating a "reduced form" 
model (see (11)) in which the outcome of the PLMP is dependent on 
required characceristics (for the applicant) imposed by the employer 
and the recruitment behaviour of the employer, while controlling for 
differences in job type and characteristics of the employers' firm. 
Thus, the probability that an individual with a certain labour market 
position will get the job is specified and estimated by means of the 
logit model. 
The dependent variable is basically split into two categories, 
namely the employed and the unemployed individuals. The data used in 
the analysis offers the possibility to distinguish a third category: 
people entering the labour force by getting a job. This category 
consists of people who just have left school or the military service. 
We then arrive at the following trichotomic classification of the 
dependent variable PLMP: 
- state 1: the vacant job is fulfilled by an employed person 
- state 2: the vacant job is fulfilled by an unemployed person 
- state 3: the vacant job is fulfilled by a person leaving school 
With this choice of the dependent variable, it is possible to compare 
(pair-wise) the probabilities of getting a job between 
(i) unemployed and employed people: 
(ii) unemployed and people leaving school 
(iii) employed people and people leaving school. 
For the aim of testing hypotheses I and II (formulated in section 1) it 
is sufficiënt to look at (i) and (ii). 
The estimates of the logit model enable us to analyze the 
different effects of the explanatory variables on the outcome of the 
PLMP. Next, we will present the separate effects of each explanatory 
variable on the probability of appointing a certain type of 
candidate12. 
12
 The separate effects of the explanatory variables on the 
probability of a certain outcome of the PAC are much easier to 
interpret than the logit estimates themselves due to the discrete 
nature of the dependent variable. 
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4.2. The logit estimates 
The direct estimates and the transformed separate effects on the 
probability of a certain outcome of the PLMP in the triple state logit 
model are presented in Table 4.2.1 and Table 4.2.2 respectively. We 
will interpret the results here in the context of the hypotheses stated 
in section 1. 
The results of the logit estimates for the unemployed relative to 
the employed people (see part (i) of Table 4.2.1) are in line with our 
prior expectations. The largest negative effects on choosing an 
unemployed in stead of an employed individual to fulfil a vacancy stem 
from the requirements of work experience and a higher educational 
level. These highly significant effects imply that hypothesis I cannot 
be rejected. Interestingly, the requirement of a certain age does not 
have a significant effect on the probability of the unemployed to get 
a job. Apparently, unemployed people do not have more difficulties to 
meet the age requirements than employed people13. 
The differences in search behaviour of the employer through the 
use of different information channels does have an effect on the (re)-
employment probability of the unemployed, but the size of the 
coefficients is substantially lower (about two to three times) than the 
effects of the required skills. Nevertheless, the use of external 
relations has the expected (significant) negative effect, while 
inversely, the use of the channel including the help of private 
employment offices (search channel others) has a positive effect of the 
same size. The use of the labour exchange office does hardly increase 
the chances for the unemployed of getting a job. This is a rather 
disappointing result for the regional labour exchange offices. On the 
basis of this research one may question the effectiveness of regional 
labour exchange offices as an intermediary on the labour market. In 
conclusion, the choice of the search channel does influence the (re)-
employment probability of the unemployed and hence - although less 
firmly than hypothesis I - hypothesis II is not rejected either. 
Other remarkable results of the logit estimates of part (i) appear 
at the control variables, especially in the "type of job" indicators. 
The probability of appointing an unemployed individual is clearly lower 
in case of a f uil-time permanent job. This might be caused by the 
relative large group of (male) employed workers who are expected to 
apply for full-time permanent jobs and hence reduce the chances for the 
unemployed. 
It also becomes clear that the vacant jobs in the urban areas 
(large cities) are relatively more fulfilled by employed than by 
unemployed people. This might be the result of differences in the size 
and composition of the stock of unemployed people in urban and rural 
areas (see Kruyt, 1987). In particular, it is possible that in the 
large cities with their high levels of (long-term) unemployment, the 
probability of the unemployed to get a job is lower because of inter 
alia differences in the degree of competition, social environment and 
work attitude. Furthermore, one may conjecture that the mobility of 
employed people is higher in the urban areas, leading to a higher 
probability that an employed person will be offered the vacant job. 
Finally, the differences among sectors/occupational groups are 
not negligible either. To start with the former, we observe a 
13
 It is noteworthy that this result does not mean that age is not 
a relevant explanatory variable for the difference in the length of 
unemployment duration (cf. Gorter et al., 1989). 
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significant negative effect of the quaternary sector on allocating an 
unemployed individual, vhich is probably due to a lack of job 
opportunities for unemployed people in this sector. Unemployed people 
have the highest probability to get a job in the construction sector 
(the reference group) inter alia due to the existence of re-hiring of 
previous employed people who are laid off temporarily and the presence 
of more vacancies with unpleasant working conditions for which 
employed people do usually not want to apply. 
Compared with the reference occupational group of "production" 
the probability of the unemployed to get a job is much smaller in all 
other occupational groups. This may be caused by the relatively low 
qualifications of unemployed which makes that many non-production jobs 
are not accessible to them. 
*********************************************************************** 
(±) carameters: unempï Loved re] .ative to the era iploved 
variant A variant B 
variable coeff. t-value coeff. t-value 
Constant 3.69 7.11* 3.42 6.77* 
Search channels 
* advertisement -0.12 -0.53 -0.18 -0.84 
* external relations -0.57 -2.19* -0.51 -1.98* 
* labour exchange O.H 0.59 0.23 0.98 
* internal -0.25 -1.07 -0.24 -1.02 
* others 0.50 2.20* 0.47 2.16* 
Age requirements -0.03 -0.14 -0.05 -0.29 
Min. required educ. 
* lower vocational -0.14 -0.46 -0.15 -0.47 
* secondary general -0.62 -1.82 -0.33 -0.84 
* medium vocational -1.00 -2.57* -0.83 -2.01* 
* high general -1.12 -2.60* -1.07 -2.37* 
Spec. educ• required 0.07 0.30 0.05 0.23 
Experience required 
* specific -1.34 -6.35* -1.30 -6.19* 
* non-specific -1.30 -4.50* -1.29 -4.44* 
Sector 
* indus trial -0.41 -1.53 
-
* services -0.40 -1.54 
-
* quaternary -0.98 -3.19* 
-
Occupation 
* admini8trative 
-
-0.92 -2.65* 
* sales 
-
-0.56 -1.50 
* technical 
-
-0.47 -1.69 
* medical/educ/soc 
-
-0.79 -1.74 
* others 
-
-0.52 -1.65 
Size of the firm 
* medium -0.14 -0.64 -0.14 -0.65 
* large -0.39 -1.61 -0.41 -1.70 
Location of the firm 
* urban -0.52 -2.83" -0.41 -2.23* 
Full time job -1.07 -3.86* -0.88 -3.31* 
Permanent job -0.99 -4.13' -0.99 -4.13* 
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(ii) parameters: unemploved relative fo the people leavlne school. 
variable 
Constant 
Search charme Is 
* advertisement 
* external relations 
* labour exchange 
* lnternal 
* others 
Age requirements 
Min. requlred educ. 
* lover vocational 
* secondary general 
* medium vocational 
* high general 
Spec. educ. requlred 
Experlence requlred 
* speclflc 
* non-specific 
Sector 
* industrial 
* services 
* quarternary 
Occupatlon 
* administrative 
* sales 
* technlcal 
* medlcal/educ/80C 
* others 
Size of the flrm 
* medium 
* large 
Location of the flrm 
* urban 
Full time Job 
Permanent Job 
logllkellhood of the logit model. 
Baseline model -664.17 -664.17 
Estimated model -541.19 -543.24 
min 2*6 Logllkellhood 245.96 241.84 
Chi-squared 67.5 (42 df) 67.5 (42 df) 
Table 4.2.1 Logit estimates of the allocation model with the previous 
labour market position of the accepted applicant until the 
moment of acceptance as the dependent variable. 
*) : coëfficiënt significant at a 5Z level. 
Ifeggnd.: 
Reference groups of the independent variables are given betwaen 
brackets: size of the flrm (small), location of the flrm (rural), 
minimum requlred education (primary), requlred experlence (no 
experlence), sector of the flrm (construction) and occupatlonal group 
of the job (production). 
********************************************************************** 
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variant A 
coeff. t-value 
3.20 2.98* 
-0.04 -0.11 
-0.48 -1.06 
1.06 2.33* 
-0.43 -1.06 
-0.57 -1.47 
-0.60 -1.68 
-0.94 -1.16 
-0.86 -1.03 
-1.37 -1.52 
-1.74 -1.86 
-0.94 -2.10* 
1.19 3.15* 
0.64 1.07 
-0.53 -0.96 
-0.45 -0.84 
-0.01 -0.01 
-0.01 -0.02 
-0.54 -1.27 
0.17 0.52 
0.95 2.18* 
-0.48 -1.15 
variant B 
coeff. t-value 
3.18 3.24* 
-0.06 -0.16 
-0.47 -1.04 
1.13 2.46* 
-0.39 -0.97 
-0.67 -1.70 
-0.66 -1.81 
-0.99 -1.20 
-0.62 -0.70 
-1.29 -1.37 
-1.69 -1.73 
-0.95 -2.12* 
1.18 3,12* 
0.63 1.07 
-0.52 -0.84 
-0.55 -0.84 
0.08 0.13 
0.29 0.36 
-0.31 -0.53 
-0.02 -0.04 
-0.57 -1.31 
0.22 0.66 
0.80 2.04* 
-0.44 -1.03 
As pointéd out above, due to the lack of specific information, it 
is difficult to prove whether the effects of the control variables 
occur because of differences in competition (e.g. tightness of the 
labour market segment), differences in suitability or willingness to 
work of the type of applicant or differences in employers' preferences 
(discrimination)14 . 
Next, we will discuss the estimation results for the unemployed 
relative to the people leaving school, as presented in part (ii) of 
Table 4.2.1. Favourable significant effects for the unemployed to get a 
job can be found for the variables of required specific experience, 
f uil time jobs and the use of the labour exchange office. On the other 
hand, we observe unfavourable effects on the acceptance of an 
unemployed individual in case of a higher educational level or when a 
specific kind of education is required by the employer. In addition, 
age restrictions do also have a negative effect on the acceptance of 
an unemployed individual. The directions of the effects are in some 
cases opposite to the ones found in the comparison of unemployed with 
employed people. This is not surprising because the competition 
between unemployed and employed people is different from the 
competition between unemployed people and people leaving school. The 
best example is found in the effect of the required specific work 
experience: compared to employed people the unemployed people are - on 
average - in a worse position, whereas they are - on average - in a 
better competitive position relative to people leaving school. 
An important explanatory search variable is the use of the labour 
exchange office, which has a significant favourable effect on the 
chances for the unemployed. The use of the other search channels does 
not have a major impact on the choice between unemployed people or 
people leaving school. 
It can be seen that the unemployed have a higher probability to 
get a f uil-time job than people leaving school. This might be due to 
differences in the willingness to work in part-time (in stead of full-
time) jobs between unemployed people and (young) people leaving school. 
In conclusion, required skills regarding specific experience and 
education play an important role in the allocation process (however, 
with opposite signs), giving additional support to hypothesis I. The 
choice of the way information is spread is - with the exception of the 
use of the labour exchange office - much less important and this 
provides only a weak support to hypothesis II. 
The separate effects of the explanatory variables on the 
estimated probability of getting a job for each category of the PLMP 
will be presented in Table 4.2.2. The effect of each dummy variable on 
the probability of choosing a certain type of worker (E,U or S) is 
calculated as follows. The relevant dummy variable is set equal to 1 
(or 0 in case of the reference group), whilst for the other variables 
their sample mean is taken. Next, we evaluate the probability of 
choosing each kind of category for these values on the basis of the 
logit estimates of the allocation model (see Table 4.2.2). 
The outcomes are much easier to interpret than the direct 
estimates of the logit model, because they demonstrate the differences 
in the probability of getting a job by each kind of category due to the 
effects of the relevant dummy variables ceteris paribus. 
1A
 There might also be an effect of unobserved characteristics of 
the vacant job, such as for example the working conditions of the job. 
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************************************* 
probabilitv of 
H s m 
62* 34Z 4Z 
calculated in the 
sample mean of the 
regressors13 
effect of: 
search channel 
advertisement 
external relations 
labour exchange 
internal 
others 
age requirements 
yes 
no 
minimum required educatlon 
primary 
low vocational 
secondary general 
secondary vocational 
university 
specific educatlon required 
yes 
no 
work experlence required 
specific 
general 
no 
sector of the firm 
construction 
industrial 
service 
quaternary 
size of the firm 
small 
roed ium 
large 
location of the firm 
rural 
urban 
type of iob 
full-time 
part-time 
permanent 
temporary 
Table 4.2.2 The effecta of the explanatory variables on the probability 
of getting a job for each category. 
Legend: 
E - employed individual 
U - unemployed individual 
S - individual leaving school 
*********************************************************************** 
64Z 32Z 4Z 
73Z 23Z 4Z 
60Z 39Z IZ 
66Z 29Z 5Z 
47Z 44Z 9Z 
62Z 33Z 5Ï 
62Z 35Z 3Z 
49Z 49Z 2Z 
53Z 44Z 3Z 
63Z 34Z 3Z 
70Z 26Z 4Z 
72Z 23Z 5Ï 
60Z 33Z 7Z 
64Z 34Z 2Z 
72Z 26Z 2Z 
69Z 27Z 4Z 
36Z 51Z 13Z 
51Z 45Z 4Z 
60Z 35Z 5Z 
60Z 35Z 5Z 
74Z 44Z 2Z 
58Z 38Z 4Z 
61Z 35Z 4Z 
66Z 29Z 5Z 
54Z 41Z 5Z 
67Z 30Z 3Z 
66Z 31Z 3Z 
37Z 50Z 13Z 
6SZ 31Z 4Z 
43Z 53Z 4Z 
13
 These frequencies are not exactly equal to the sample 
frequencles of the different categories because of the non-linearity of 
the logit model. 
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In this' way, we can observe that the requirement of work 
experience (in stead of imposing no work experience) reduces the 
probability of getting a job by an unemployed person by 25% (from 51% 
to 26%) and increases the probability for the employed people with 36% 
(from 36% to 72%)! Again, it becomes clear that imposing work 
experience has a dramatic impact on the outcome of the PLMP. 
The second most striking change in probability does occur as a 
result of the requirement of the highest educational level in stead of 
the primary level (minus 26% for the unemployed and plus 23% and 3% for 
the employed people and people leaving school, respectively). 
Although it is from our data set not entirely clear what the 
reasons are behind the effects of the "job- and firm" characteristics, 
the outcomes are remarkably large. The probability that an employed 
person will get the job is 29% higher for full-time jobs (compared 
with part-time jobs), 23% higher for permanent jobs (compared with 
temporary jobs) and 23% higher for jobs in the quaternary sector 
(compared with the construction sector). 
Finally, we will look at the performance of the model with respect 
to the overall explanatory power of the model, the predictive power of 
the model, the outliers of the model and the robustness of the 
parameters of the model. 
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) specification test indicates that the 
estimated models (variant A and B) are both a significant improvement 
of the model without explanatory variables (base-line model). 
It is possible to consider the predictive power of the model by 
comparing the observed choices with the predictive choices of the 
estimated model. This is done for variant A in table 4.2.3. 
******************************************************* 
observed 
predicted employed unemployed school total 
employed 365 136 24 525 
unemployed 72 123 22 217 
school 7 4 9 20 
total 444 263 55 762 
Table 4.2.3 Predicted versus observed choices of the PLMP 
on the basis of the logit estimates of variant A. 
********************************************************************** 
It becomes clear that in 64% of all cases a correct prediction is 
given by the model. With the logit estimates, we are able to predict 
the outcome of the allocation of an employed person fairly well (82% 
of the cases is correct), but the model does perform badly with respect 
to the choice of people leaving school (only 16% correctly predicted). 
This is probably caused by the relatively low number of observations in 
this category (about 7% of the sample). 
The bad performance of the model with respect to the prediction of 
the choice of people leaving school is also confirmed by the finding of 
10 outliers (i.e. observations with a probability of the observed 
choice of less than 0.05), all of them corresponding to the choice of 
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an individual 'leaving school. 
Using the sectoral (variant A) or the occupational (variant B) 
classification does not make much difference for the overall fit of the 
model, so that both variants may be used to interpret the results. Most 
of the estimated coefficients of the variables (other than the 
sector/occupational group) are robust against the choice of the 
sectoral or occupational level. However, the estimates of the 
coefficients for the minimum required education are slightly different. 
5. Concluding remarks. 
The aim of this article was to study the re-employment 
probabilities of the unemployed from a different perspective than the 
usual one in which a job-seeking individual has to decide on accepting 
a job offer or not. In this usual approach, the emphasis is placed on 
the search behaviour and the labour market characteristics of the job-
seeking individual. In general, the conclusion from studies for the 
Netherlands in the 80's is that unemployed people with a low 
educational level and without labour market experience have very small 
chances to obtain a job. 
In this article, we have tried to examine whether this conclusion 
is confirmed by a demand side oriented approach, based on the 
recruitment behaviour of the employer. In particular, we have 
postulated two hypotheses about the effect of the recruitment behaviour 
of the employer on the probability of the unemployed to get a job. The 
first hypothesis complies with the finding of the supply-side oriented 
studies: 
(I) The unemployed do not easily get jobs because they cannot meet the 
requirements (education, experience, etc) of the vacant job. 
The second hypothesis, however, contains a rather new element in the 
study of the re-employment probabilities of the unemployed, viz. 
(II) The unemployed do not get easily get jobs because they do not have 
access to (information on) vacant jobs due to the use of specific 
recruitment channels by the employer. 
In order to test the hypotheses, we have derived a model in which 
the outcome of the allocation process is related to characteristics of 
the vacant job and the search behaviour of the employer. 
We conclude from the estimation results that 
(a) job requirements for the applicants are the most important 
determinant of the outcome of the previous labour market position 
of the accepted applicant (PLMP). 
(b) the effect of the use of search channels by the employer is less 
significant than the job requirements, but does play a role. 
(c) the "type of job- and firm" characteristics are also of 
significant importance, representing the (unidentified) effects of 
* the degree of competition 
* the average suitability of the type of applicant 
* the possible discriminatory behaviour of the employer 
Summing up, the empirical results derived from a demand side 
oriented approach support the findings of the supply side studies, but 
also show that the use of search and selection methods by the employer 
is a critical determinant of the re-employment probabilities of the 
unemployed. 
Data limitations strongly influenced the statistical approach used 
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in this paper.' With more complete data (e.g. on all applicants actually 
considered for a vacancy; not only the selected applicant) one may 
arrive at more refined results. 
An interesting topic of future research would be the study of 
vacancy chains. If a vacancy is not fulfilled by an unemployed person, 
but by a person already having a job, unemployed people may still 
benefit from it because the fulfilment of one vacancy may imply the 
creation of another vacancy. This would lead to approaches similar to 
those on vacant dwellings in housing markets (cf. Rouwendal and 
Rietveld, 1988). A possible implication of a vacancy chain is that- if 
chains are long enough - one may help unemployed persons in getting a 
job by creating new jobs for which they themselves would not be 
qualified. Much would depend of cour se on the length of the chain and 
the existence of barriers impeding mobility on the labour market. 
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APPENDIX A. 
In this appendix, the data source and an overview of the explanatory 
variables are presented. 
a) The data source 
The data used in our analysis of employers recruitment behaviour 
stem from a survey of the ILBO Institute (Instituut voor Longitudinaal 
Beleidsonderzoek) carried out in request of the Dutch Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment (the survey was labelled "How do firms 
recruit"). This survey of employers' recruitment behaviour was 
undertaken for the first time in December 1984 and has been repeated 
once a year ever since. 
In April/May 1986 a sample of 3198 firms was drawn. Non-response 
and other reasons (such as firm closures) reduced the sample to 2702 
firms. The remaining sample was stratified according to (construction, 
industrial, service and quaternary) sector and size of the firm (small, 
medium, large). 
From the sample in this survey, firms were selected on the basis 
of two criteria: 
1 the firms should have had at least one vacancy which has been 
fulfilled during the past six months 
2 the employer should have searched for applicants by using external 
channels only or a combination of both internal and external 
channels. 
In this way a subsample of 763 firms - used in this paper - has 
been selected. 
b) Summarv indicators of the data in the sample 
recruitment channels15 
internal recruitment 
external relations 
advertising 
labour exchange office 
employment office + others 
required characteristics 
age requirements 
educational requirements 
* primary level 
* low vocational level 
* secondary level 
* extended vocational level 
* university/ high vocational level 
specific educational requirements 
number of times used 
236 
126 
163 
192 
185 
total: 902 
ves no 
51Z 49Z 
percentage 
9Z 
30Z 
20Z 
25% 
16% 
ves no 
46Z 54Z 
15
 Note that the employer may use more than one recruitment 
channel at the time. 
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work experience requirements percentage 
* special work experience 58% 
* work experience 13% 
* no work experience 29% 
job and firm characteristics 
sector (variant A) percentage 
* construction 20% 
* industry 23% 
* services 30% 
* government 27% 
occupational group (variant B) percentage 
* administrative 25% 
* technical 23% 
* sales 11% 
* medical/educational/social 8% 
* production 19% 
* other 14% 
size of the firm percentage 
* small 28% 
* medium 39% 
* large 33% 
location of the firm percentage 
* urban 63% 
* rural 37% 
Yes No 
permanent job 84% 16% 
full-time job 84% 16% 
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